CRITICAL SECURITY FIX: - Email code required EVERY login (authentication, not verification) - DNS TXT check cached separately (domain verification) - New auth_sessions table for per-login state - Codes hashed with SHA-256, constant-time comparison - Max 3 attempts, 10-minute session expiry - OAuth params stored server-side (security improvement) New files: - services/auth_session.py - migrations 004, 005 - ADR-010: domain verification vs user authentication 312 tests passing, 86.21% coverage 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
246 lines
7.4 KiB
Markdown
246 lines
7.4 KiB
Markdown
# Authentication Flow Fix Design
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## Problem Statement
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The current implementation conflates domain verification (one-time DNS check) with user authentication (per-login email verification). This creates a security vulnerability where only the first user needs to authenticate via email code, while subsequent users bypass authentication entirely.
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## Core Concepts
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### Domain Verification
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- **Purpose**: Establish that a domain is configured to use this IndieAuth server
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- **Method**: DNS TXT record containing server-specific verification string
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- **Frequency**: Once per domain, results cached in database
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- **Storage**: `domains` table with verification status and timestamp
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### User Authentication
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- **Purpose**: Prove the current user owns the claimed identity
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- **Method**: Time-limited 6-digit code sent to rel="me" email
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- **Frequency**: EVERY authorization attempt
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- **Storage**: Temporary session storage, expires after 5-10 minutes
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## Corrected Authorization Flow
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### Step 1: Authorization Request
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Client initiates OAuth flow:
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```
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GET /authorize?
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response_type=code&
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client_id=https://app.example.com&
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redirect_uri=https://app.example.com/callback&
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state=xyz&
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code_challenge=abc&
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code_challenge_method=S256&
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me=https://user.example.com
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```
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### Step 2: Domain Verification Check
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1. Extract domain from `me` parameter
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2. Check `domains` table for existing verification:
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```sql
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SELECT verified, last_checked
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FROM domains
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WHERE domain = 'user.example.com'
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```
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3. If not verified or stale (>24 hours):
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- Check DNS TXT record at `_indieauth.user.example.com`
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- Update database with verification status
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4. If domain not verified, reject with error
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### Step 3: Profile Discovery
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1. Fetch the user's homepage at `me` URL
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2. Parse for IndieAuth metadata:
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- Authorization endpoint (must be this server)
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- Token endpoint (if present)
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- rel="me" links for authentication options
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3. Extract email from rel="me" links
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### Step 4: User Authentication (ALWAYS REQUIRED)
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1. Generate 6-digit code
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2. Store in session with expiration:
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```json
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{
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"session_id": "uuid",
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"me": "https://user.example.com",
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"email": "user@example.com",
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"code": "123456",
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"client_id": "https://app.example.com",
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"redirect_uri": "https://app.example.com/callback",
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"state": "xyz",
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"code_challenge": "abc",
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"expires_at": "2024-01-01T12:05:00Z"
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}
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```
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3. Send code via email
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4. Show code entry form
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### Step 5: Code Verification
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1. User submits code
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2. Validate against session storage
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3. If valid, mark session as authenticated
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4. If invalid, allow retry (max 3 attempts)
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### Step 6: Consent
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1. Show consent page with client details
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2. User approves/denies
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3. If approved, generate authorization code
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### Step 7: Authorization Code
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1. Generate authorization code
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2. Store with session binding:
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```json
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{
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"code": "auth_code_xyz",
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"session_id": "uuid",
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"me": "https://user.example.com",
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"client_id": "https://app.example.com",
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"redirect_uri": "https://app.example.com/callback",
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"code_challenge": "abc",
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"expires_at": "2024-01-01T12:10:00Z"
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}
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```
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3. Redirect to client with code
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## Data Models
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### domains table (persistent)
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```sql
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CREATE TABLE domains (
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domain VARCHAR(255) PRIMARY KEY,
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verified BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
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verification_string VARCHAR(255),
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last_checked TIMESTAMP,
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created_at TIMESTAMP DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
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updated_at TIMESTAMP DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP ON UPDATE CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
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);
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```
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### auth_sessions table (temporary, cleaned periodically)
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```sql
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CREATE TABLE auth_sessions (
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session_id VARCHAR(255) PRIMARY KEY,
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me VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
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email VARCHAR(255),
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verification_code VARCHAR(6),
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code_verified BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
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client_id VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
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redirect_uri VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
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state VARCHAR(255),
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code_challenge VARCHAR(255),
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code_challenge_method VARCHAR(10),
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created_at TIMESTAMP DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
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expires_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
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INDEX idx_expires (expires_at)
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);
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```
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### authorization_codes table (temporary)
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```sql
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CREATE TABLE authorization_codes (
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code VARCHAR(255) PRIMARY KEY,
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session_id VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
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me VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
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client_id VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
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redirect_uri VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
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code_challenge VARCHAR(255),
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used BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
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created_at TIMESTAMP DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
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expires_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
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FOREIGN KEY (session_id) REFERENCES auth_sessions(session_id),
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INDEX idx_expires (expires_at)
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);
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```
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## Session Management
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### Session Creation
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- Generate UUID for session_id
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- Set expiration to 10 minutes for email verification
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- Store all OAuth parameters in session
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### Session Validation
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- Check expiration on every access
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- Verify session_id matches throughout flow
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- Clear expired sessions periodically (cron job)
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### Security Considerations
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- Session IDs must be cryptographically random
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- Email codes must be 6 random digits
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- Authorization codes must be unguessable
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- All temporary data expires and is cleaned up
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## Error Handling
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### Domain Not Verified
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```json
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{
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"error": "unauthorized_client",
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"error_description": "Domain not configured for this IndieAuth server"
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}
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```
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### Invalid Email Code
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```json
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{
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"error": "access_denied",
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"error_description": "Invalid verification code"
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}
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```
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### Session Expired
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```json
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{
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"error": "invalid_request",
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"error_description": "Session expired, please start over"
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}
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```
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## Migration from Current Implementation
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1. **Immediate**: Disable caching of email verification
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2. **Add auth_sessions table**: Track per-login authentication state
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3. **Modify verification flow**: Always require email code
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4. **Update domain verification**: Separate from user authentication
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5. **Clean up old code**: Remove improper caching logic
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## Testing Requirements
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### Unit Tests
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- Domain verification logic (DNS lookup, caching)
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- Session management (creation, expiration, cleanup)
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- Email code generation and validation
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- Authorization code generation and exchange
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### Integration Tests
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- Full authorization flow with email verification
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- Multiple concurrent users for same domain
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- Session expiration during flow
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- Domain verification caching behavior
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### Security Tests
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- Ensure email verification required every login
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- Verify sessions properly isolated between users
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- Test rate limiting on code attempts
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- Verify all codes are single-use
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## Acceptance Criteria
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1. ✓ Domain verification via DNS TXT is cached appropriately
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2. ✓ Email verification code is required for EVERY login attempt
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3. ✓ Multiple users can authenticate for the same domain independently
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4. ✓ Sessions expire and are cleaned up properly
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5. ✓ Authorization codes are single-use
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6. ✓ Clear separation between domain verification and user authentication
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7. ✓ No security regression from current (broken) implementation
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## Implementation Priority
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**CRITICAL**: This is a security vulnerability that must be fixed immediately. The current implementation allows unauthenticated access after the first user logs in for a domain.
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## Notes
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The confusion between domain verification and user authentication is a fundamental architectural error. This fix properly separates these concerns:
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- **Domain verification** establishes trust in the domain configuration (one-time)
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- **User authentication** establishes trust in the current user (every time)
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This aligns with the IndieAuth specification where the authorization endpoint MUST authenticate the user, not just verify the domain. |