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Gondulf/docs/designs/authentication-flow-fix.md
Phil Skentelbery 9135edfe84 fix(auth): require email authentication every login
CRITICAL SECURITY FIX:
- Email code required EVERY login (authentication, not verification)
- DNS TXT check cached separately (domain verification)
- New auth_sessions table for per-login state
- Codes hashed with SHA-256, constant-time comparison
- Max 3 attempts, 10-minute session expiry
- OAuth params stored server-side (security improvement)

New files:
- services/auth_session.py
- migrations 004, 005
- ADR-010: domain verification vs user authentication

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Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-11-22 15:16:26 -07:00

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Markdown

# Authentication Flow Fix Design
## Problem Statement
The current implementation conflates domain verification (one-time DNS check) with user authentication (per-login email verification). This creates a security vulnerability where only the first user needs to authenticate via email code, while subsequent users bypass authentication entirely.
## Core Concepts
### Domain Verification
- **Purpose**: Establish that a domain is configured to use this IndieAuth server
- **Method**: DNS TXT record containing server-specific verification string
- **Frequency**: Once per domain, results cached in database
- **Storage**: `domains` table with verification status and timestamp
### User Authentication
- **Purpose**: Prove the current user owns the claimed identity
- **Method**: Time-limited 6-digit code sent to rel="me" email
- **Frequency**: EVERY authorization attempt
- **Storage**: Temporary session storage, expires after 5-10 minutes
## Corrected Authorization Flow
### Step 1: Authorization Request
Client initiates OAuth flow:
```
GET /authorize?
response_type=code&
client_id=https://app.example.com&
redirect_uri=https://app.example.com/callback&
state=xyz&
code_challenge=abc&
code_challenge_method=S256&
me=https://user.example.com
```
### Step 2: Domain Verification Check
1. Extract domain from `me` parameter
2. Check `domains` table for existing verification:
```sql
SELECT verified, last_checked
FROM domains
WHERE domain = 'user.example.com'
```
3. If not verified or stale (>24 hours):
- Check DNS TXT record at `_indieauth.user.example.com`
- Update database with verification status
4. If domain not verified, reject with error
### Step 3: Profile Discovery
1. Fetch the user's homepage at `me` URL
2. Parse for IndieAuth metadata:
- Authorization endpoint (must be this server)
- Token endpoint (if present)
- rel="me" links for authentication options
3. Extract email from rel="me" links
### Step 4: User Authentication (ALWAYS REQUIRED)
1. Generate 6-digit code
2. Store in session with expiration:
```json
{
"session_id": "uuid",
"me": "https://user.example.com",
"email": "user@example.com",
"code": "123456",
"client_id": "https://app.example.com",
"redirect_uri": "https://app.example.com/callback",
"state": "xyz",
"code_challenge": "abc",
"expires_at": "2024-01-01T12:05:00Z"
}
```
3. Send code via email
4. Show code entry form
### Step 5: Code Verification
1. User submits code
2. Validate against session storage
3. If valid, mark session as authenticated
4. If invalid, allow retry (max 3 attempts)
### Step 6: Consent
1. Show consent page with client details
2. User approves/denies
3. If approved, generate authorization code
### Step 7: Authorization Code
1. Generate authorization code
2. Store with session binding:
```json
{
"code": "auth_code_xyz",
"session_id": "uuid",
"me": "https://user.example.com",
"client_id": "https://app.example.com",
"redirect_uri": "https://app.example.com/callback",
"code_challenge": "abc",
"expires_at": "2024-01-01T12:10:00Z"
}
```
3. Redirect to client with code
## Data Models
### domains table (persistent)
```sql
CREATE TABLE domains (
domain VARCHAR(255) PRIMARY KEY,
verified BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
verification_string VARCHAR(255),
last_checked TIMESTAMP,
created_at TIMESTAMP DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
updated_at TIMESTAMP DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP ON UPDATE CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
);
```
### auth_sessions table (temporary, cleaned periodically)
```sql
CREATE TABLE auth_sessions (
session_id VARCHAR(255) PRIMARY KEY,
me VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
email VARCHAR(255),
verification_code VARCHAR(6),
code_verified BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
client_id VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
redirect_uri VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
state VARCHAR(255),
code_challenge VARCHAR(255),
code_challenge_method VARCHAR(10),
created_at TIMESTAMP DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
expires_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
INDEX idx_expires (expires_at)
);
```
### authorization_codes table (temporary)
```sql
CREATE TABLE authorization_codes (
code VARCHAR(255) PRIMARY KEY,
session_id VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
me VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
client_id VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
redirect_uri VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
code_challenge VARCHAR(255),
used BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
created_at TIMESTAMP DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,
expires_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
FOREIGN KEY (session_id) REFERENCES auth_sessions(session_id),
INDEX idx_expires (expires_at)
);
```
## Session Management
### Session Creation
- Generate UUID for session_id
- Set expiration to 10 minutes for email verification
- Store all OAuth parameters in session
### Session Validation
- Check expiration on every access
- Verify session_id matches throughout flow
- Clear expired sessions periodically (cron job)
### Security Considerations
- Session IDs must be cryptographically random
- Email codes must be 6 random digits
- Authorization codes must be unguessable
- All temporary data expires and is cleaned up
## Error Handling
### Domain Not Verified
```json
{
"error": "unauthorized_client",
"error_description": "Domain not configured for this IndieAuth server"
}
```
### Invalid Email Code
```json
{
"error": "access_denied",
"error_description": "Invalid verification code"
}
```
### Session Expired
```json
{
"error": "invalid_request",
"error_description": "Session expired, please start over"
}
```
## Migration from Current Implementation
1. **Immediate**: Disable caching of email verification
2. **Add auth_sessions table**: Track per-login authentication state
3. **Modify verification flow**: Always require email code
4. **Update domain verification**: Separate from user authentication
5. **Clean up old code**: Remove improper caching logic
## Testing Requirements
### Unit Tests
- Domain verification logic (DNS lookup, caching)
- Session management (creation, expiration, cleanup)
- Email code generation and validation
- Authorization code generation and exchange
### Integration Tests
- Full authorization flow with email verification
- Multiple concurrent users for same domain
- Session expiration during flow
- Domain verification caching behavior
### Security Tests
- Ensure email verification required every login
- Verify sessions properly isolated between users
- Test rate limiting on code attempts
- Verify all codes are single-use
## Acceptance Criteria
1. ✓ Domain verification via DNS TXT is cached appropriately
2. ✓ Email verification code is required for EVERY login attempt
3. ✓ Multiple users can authenticate for the same domain independently
4. ✓ Sessions expire and are cleaned up properly
5. ✓ Authorization codes are single-use
6. ✓ Clear separation between domain verification and user authentication
7. ✓ No security regression from current (broken) implementation
## Implementation Priority
**CRITICAL**: This is a security vulnerability that must be fixed immediately. The current implementation allows unauthenticated access after the first user logs in for a domain.
## Notes
The confusion between domain verification and user authentication is a fundamental architectural error. This fix properly separates these concerns:
- **Domain verification** establishes trust in the domain configuration (one-time)
- **User authentication** establishes trust in the current user (every time)
This aligns with the IndieAuth specification where the authorization endpoint MUST authenticate the user, not just verify the domain.