- All dependencies to current releases (97 known vulnerabilities -> 0), Python 3.14, uv pinned, requirements-test.txt, lxml/dateutil pinned - CSRF tokens on admin forms, logout and IndieAuth consent - IndieAuth client and crosspost link-card fetches via safe_get - FLASK_DEBUG/FLASK_ENV default off/production; image sets them - Foreign keys enforced on pooled connections; migration 018 removes orphans - Rate limits shared across processes (rate_limits, migration 019) - datetime.utcnow() and sqlite3 default adapters replaced - compose.yaml fixed; duplicate dev_auth.py and test.ini removed Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
57 lines
2.0 KiB
Python
57 lines
2.0 KiB
Python
"""
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CSRF protection for the admin and consent forms (v2.11.0)
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The token is an HMAC of the login session cookie under the app secret: no
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storage, tied to the session, and different after every login. Forms carry
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it as a hidden `csrf_token` field (template global `csrf_token()`); POSTs to
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protected endpoints without the right token get 400.
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Protected: every admin POST, logout, and the IndieAuth consent ("approve").
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Endpoints used by apps with bearer tokens (Micropub, token, revoke,
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Webmention, WebSub) are not: they have no cookie-based authority.
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"""
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import hashlib
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import hmac
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from flask import abort, current_app, request
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SESSION_COOKIE = "starpunk_session"
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FIELD = "csrf_token"
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HEADER = "X-CSRF-Token"
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PROTECTED_ENDPOINTS = {"auth.logout", "indieauth.approve"}
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def csrf_token() -> str:
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"""The CSRF token for the current login session ('' when not logged in)"""
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session = request.cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE)
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if not session:
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return ""
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key = str(current_app.config["SECRET_KEY"]).encode("utf-8")
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return hmac.new(key, b"csrf:" + session.encode("utf-8"), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
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def _protected() -> bool:
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return request.blueprint == "admin" or request.endpoint in PROTECTED_ENDPOINTS
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def check_csrf():
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"""before_request: refuse state-changing requests without a valid token"""
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if request.method in ("GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS") or not current_app.config.get("CSRF_ENABLED", True):
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return None
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if not _protected():
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return None
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expected = csrf_token()
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if not expected:
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return None # not logged in: the route's own auth check refuses it
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sent = request.form.get(FIELD) or request.headers.get(HEADER) or ""
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if not hmac.compare_digest(sent, expected):
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current_app.logger.warning(f"CSRF token missing or wrong for {request.endpoint}")
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abort(400, description="The form expired or came from another site. Reload the page and try again.")
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return None
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def init_app(app) -> None:
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app.before_request(check_csrf)
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app.add_template_global(csrf_token, "csrf_token")
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